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Abstract 
 
Complex	and	tightly	coupled	organizations,	despite	having	clear	command	lines	and	rigorous	procedures,	
may	be	vulnerable	to	unexpected	events	that	threaten	their	operations.	To	succeed,	they	need	the	capacity	to	
respond	flexibly	and	swiftly.	In	subsea	operations,	it	has	been	proposed	that	when	disruptive	events	occur	
while	the	formal	leader	is	focused	on	task	coordination,	others	with	sufficient	time,	competence	and	standing	
step	in	and	exercise	informal	leadership.	This	leadership	redundancy	has	been	described	as	a	managerial	
resource	that	provides	critical	organizational	slack.	The	present	paper	describes	a	methodology	to	test	the	
leadership	redundancy	hypothesis	and	summarizes	main	findings.		
	
Method:	Stimulus	cases	have	been	distilled	from	studies	of	one	subsea	vessel	that	describe	a	triggering	
situation	(an	unexpected	event	that	disturbs	the	operation,	while	the	formal	leader	is	unable	to	respond),	and	
an	intervention	that	illustrates	informal	leadership	redundancy	(somebody	other	than	the	formal	leader	
fulfills	a	necessary	leadership	function).	35	informants	from	the	subsea	business	were	interviewed	about	
their	reactions	to	the	cases.	Their	responses	were	analyzed	for	1)	the	realism	of	the	cases,	2)	the	realism	of	
the	intervention,	and	3)	the	evaluation	of	the	interventions.		
	
Findings:	Informants	confirmed	that	the	formal	leader	of	the	subsea	operation	must	focus	his	attention	on	
task	coordination,	and	that	disruptive	events	occur	that	may	exceed	his	capacity	to	respond.		All	the	triggering	
situations	were	confirmed	as	realistic.	Interventions	that	concern	boundary	management	and	problem	solving	
were	confirmed	as	realistic	and	appropriate.	However,	coaching	performed	by	somebody	other	than	the	
formal	leader	was	controversial.	
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Foreword 
This research forms part of the Complexity Project at the Stord Haugesund University College in 
Haugesund, Norway. The college and companies in the petromaritime industries in the region are 
collaborating on this project. The Research Council of Norway has funded 80% and the partners 
20%.  
 
The broad question for the project is to understand how companies involved in petromaritime 
operations handle complexity challenges. The exemplar case covered in the present report is 
IMR operations: subsea operations that take care of inspection, maintenance and repair of the 
subsea infrastructure off the coasts of Norway. This working paper documents the methodology 
and findings from some of our investigations into IMR operations.  
 
The working paper gives more detail than one would expect to find in a journal article, and is 
intended as a source document for use by our own team and for other researchers who want to go 
deeper into our methods and findings. 
 
The team is grateful to Associate Professor John Ferkingstad and to Amy Meltzer, Ph.D., for 
their advice on revising this document. 
 
Foreword to the second, revised edition 
	
In	2015	we	published	analyses	based	on	the	data	collection	introduced	in	the	first	edition	
of	the	present	report	(Johannessen,	McArthur	and	Jonassen	2015).	In	the	process	of	
analysis	we	had	many	discussions	with	colleagues	about	the	methodology	and	the	
interpretation	of	the	data.	We	are	particularly	indebted	to	professor	Helen	Sampson	of	
Seafarer’s	International	Research	Centre	at	Cardiff	University,	Wales,	who	pointed	out	a	
problem	with	one	of	our	cases.	
	
Case	#2	in	the	first	edition	was,	like	the	other	cases,	based	on	a	real	incident,	and	the	
interviews	triggered	interesting	reactions	from	the	informants.	However,	we	came	to	
realize	that	the	story	did	not	constitute	an	unambiguous	example	of	the	phenomenon	that	
we	had	labeled	informal	leadership	redundancy.	In	Case	#2,	a	shift	supervisor	gives	in	to	
pressure	from	a	client	to	take	on	work	outside	his	contractual	obligations	and	outside	his	
expertise.	The	shift	supervisor	can	be	seen	as	failing	to	exercise	an	important	leadership	
function,	boundary	management.	An	offshore	manager	who	overhears	the	conversation	
intervenes	and	helps	the	shift	supervisor	maintain	the	appropriate	boundary.	The	difficulty	
with	the	example	is	that	the	offshore	manager	is	also	the	formal	leader	of	the	shift	
supervisor.	He	could	therefore	be	seen	as	exercising	his	own	leadership	functions,	rather	
than	stepping	in	for	his	subordinate.	
	
For	this	reason,	the	case	was	left	out	of	the	analyses	that	we	wrote	later.	In	the	present,	
second	edition	of	our	methodological	report	we	have	also	left	out	the	discussion	of	case	#2,	
but	the	text	of	the	stimulus	case	can	still	be	found	in	Appendix	1.	
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Introduction  
Theories of high reliability-seeking organizations (HROs) have proposed how certain 
organizational features, such as the capacity to anticipate and contain surprise (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007) and to supplement structural rigor with the capacity for flexible response (Faraj 
& Xiao, 2006) can help explain how some organizations may excel under stress. This theoretical 
framing alongside our practical opportunities form the background for our choice to study IMR 
operations: 
 
1. They qualified as high reliability seeking organizations since they have a record for safe and 
successful operations while facing high complexity challenges. 
2. They were accessible to us through our industry partners. 
 
An initial two-week field study on an IMR vessel was conducted in 2009. This helped us get 
acquainted with the business (Johannessen, 2015 b). We soon got confirmation that IMR 
operations (like the rest of the Norwegian oil and gas industry) rely on procedures, rules and 
structures for running the operations safely and effectively. We noticed (Johannessen, McArthur, 
& Jonassen, 2012; Jonassen, 2012) how a particular operational multi-team system (Mathieu, 
Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001) springs into action in the intense periods when the operation proper is 
executed, and how all operational resources are put under the leadership of a shift supervisor.  
 
Inspired by earlier research on HROs (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) we hypothesized that this 
operational organization, alongside its procedural rigor, needed to be able to respond flexibly to 
the impact of surprise and disturbances. We developed a strategy based on this assumption for 
analyzing the data from the field trip. 
 
We looked for examples where operational managers were facing tough, non-trivial choices that 
called for discretion, consultation, and a willingness to act on limited information. These 
examples, it seemed to us, could be a window into how this particular system operated when it 
needed to strike a balance between structure and flexibility.  
 
We thought that the most interesting cases might be those that could be construed as dilemmas: 
situations where several alternatives are possible, each with pros and cons, and where the 
decision is difficult. This idea provided a heuristic that helped us build our understanding of the 
data. We sifted through interviews and documented a collection of such situations into a 
‘dilemma catalogue’1, and discussed how we could make sense of them. This lead us to look 
more closely at the execution phase of the operations, and at how leadership resources were 
mobilized and put to use in this phase (Johannessen, McArthur, & Jonassen, 2015). We 
concluded that: 
 
1. In the execution phase of the operations, authority migrates from the offshore manager to 
the shift supervisor who is responsible for coordinating and conducting the complex 
interactions necessary for a successful operation. For the duration of an operation, those 
involved defer to the shift supervisor’s direction, regardless of what company they work 
for. 
																																																								
1	The	examples	were	a	mix	of	dilemmas	in	the	strict	sense	of	the	word	and	other	challenges. 
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2. This coordinating shift supervisor tends to stay task focused, having little time left to 
attend to other leadership functions, such as team relations or coaching. 
3. Disturbances do occur that may potentially jeopardize the smooth running of the 
operation. To deal with the disturbances, leadership functions other than task 
coordination may be called for. 
4. In some cases, when the need arises, others will step in and take care of leadership 
functions that need attention and that fall under the purview of the shift supervisor. 
5. We proposed that leadership redundancy is the availability and use of extra leadership 
resources to compensate for leadership functions that may otherwise not be taken care of. 
 
We wanted to test more broadly (within the IMR business) if key informants would recognize 
informal leadership redundancy as a mechanism that might help the organization respond 
flexibly to needs as they arise, and, to explore the conditions under which that mechanism might 
work or fail.  There were two reasons why we wanted to do a broader study. The field study on 
which these propositions are based consisted of just one vessel. There was a possibility that the 
Table A: Informants by Role and Affiliation 
Role  Affiliation  Informants  Informants net   
Captain	 Shipping	company 5 0	
Client	representative	 Oil	Company	 6	 6	
Offshore	manager	
	
Subsea	Contractor	 5	 4	
Project	engineer	
		
Subsea	Contractor	 5	 5	
	
Medic*	
Subsea	
Contractor/Shipping	
Company	
6 6	
	
Shift	supervisor	
		
Subsea	Contractor	 8	 8	
	
ROV	supervisor	
		
Subsea	Contractor	 5	 5	
Deck	foreman		 Subsea	Contractor	 1	 1	
SUM	  41	 35	
*)	Medics	are	in	most	cases	subcontracted	from	a	company	that	specializes	in	HSE	services,	but	tend	to	stay	
with	the	same	vessel	for	extended	periods	of	time.	Hired	medics	report	to	the	captain	in	health	matters	and	
to	the	offshore	manager	in	safety	matters.	
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findings were based on peculiarities of one ‘local’ culture.  Also, extant theory (Sagan, 2004) 
suggested that there might be problems as well as gains from redundancies. For example, 
initiatives to supplement the shift supervisor during the tightly orchestrated flow of an operation 
might be seen as a disturbance of the system and not just an advantage. This was not explored in 
depth in the field study.    
 
For those reasons we devised a method for testing our hypothesis and collected new data from 
June through December 2011. The present working paper presents: 
 
• Our method; the rationale and procedure for using stimulus cases, how informants 
were selected, the procedure for conducting and documenting interviews and 
analysis. 
• Our findings; the constraints on the shift supervisor’s role and the informants’ 
reaction to three stimulus cases that illustrate three leadership functions (boundary 
management, coaching and problem solving).  
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The Stimulus Case Method 
We applied a stimulus case method for semi-experimental testing  (Johannessen & Olsen, 2003) 
and selected five examples from the dilemma catalog that we saw as examples of informal 
leadership redundancy and turned them into mini-cases. We knew that the examples had 
occurred in at least one case, so that they in that respect were realistic. They all illustrated how 
an “adjacent resource” (most often a leader) would step in and take care of a leadership function 
that might otherwise have been neglected, and therefore constituted an example of leadership 
redundancy. All examples were taken from the busy execution phase of an operation; we 
expected that disturbances in this phase might be the most difficult to handle, and might trigger 
leadership redundancy. 
Figure 1: Data Analysis Template 
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We sought help from insiders in the business (in individual conversations and in a seminar) to 
make sure that the cases were realistic and clear, and to remove ‘noise’, such as 
misunderstandings of jargon that would take the readers’ attention away from the message. A 
collection of cases was rewritten in a shorter format, so that a reader might react to four within a 
time frame of 30 minutes (see Appendix 1). After the first test run on a vessel in June 2011, one 
of the short cases (Case #4) was replaced (as it turned out not to be a clear example of a distinct 
leadership function), and some minor improvements were made on the others. 
	
The	scenarios	all	follow	the	same	logic:	
	
• A problematic triggering situation that can cause a disturbance to the operation is 
described. 
• Addressing the problem means executing a leadership function (in our cases, boundary 
management, coaching and problem solving). 
• In the scenario, the assigned leader does not fill the relevant leadership function, but 
somebody else steps in. 
	
 
We invited our new subjects to engage in a thought experiment and react to the examples. We 
asked if they recognized the situation that triggered an intervention, and the intervention itself. 
We hoped that this would tell us how typical the triggering situations and the leadership 
redundancy interventions might be. 
 
In addition, we asked the informants for their evaluation of the illustrated interventions, and the 
reasoning behind those evaluations. We hoped that this would give us information about 
mindsets and tacit rules in the culture and potential problems with informal leadership 
redundancy as a capacity for flexible response. 
 
Our experience shows that: 
	
• We could focus the attention of subjects and get their reactions in ways that are 
relatively easy to compare 
• Since the examples are ‘historical’, subjects could choose how much they wanted to 
open up about their own personal experiences, and still give concrete reactions to a 
situation close to their own reality. 
• The informants engaged freely and pushed back on the realism of the triggering 
situation or the interventions that they found in the cases. A concern that we had 
discussed in the beginning (that the stimulus cases might be too leading) seems not to 
have been justified. 
• The focused stimulus cases allowed us to cover more ground in a shorter time than we 
could in traditional interviews.  
• The interviews did not yield many new examples or analogies of other instances of 
leadership redundancy. 
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Selection	of	Informants	and	Contexts	
Starting in June 2011, two researchers conducted a series of visits to IMR vessels when they 
were in port (in Norway and in Scotland). Such a port call gave us research periods ranging from 
a few hours to two days. All vessels are under Norwegian ownership and legislation.  
 
Each context has the same inter-organizational configuration: a client hires an subsea contractor 
who hires a vessel from a shipping company. In addition, the client will hire specialists directly 
(third parties). 
 
In the interest of getting in-depth descriptions of one setting we chose to continue investigations 
on the vessel where the original field study had taken place, and on two of its sister vessels. For 
contrast, we also did the same data collection on vessels from two other shipping companies.  
 
Port calls in this business happen at crew changes (typically once every two weeks) or when the 
vessel needs repair or supplies. Vessels of this kind rarely know exactly where and when they 
will call on a port until a day before. The uncertainty comes from changing operational priorities 
and unstable weather. For that reason, researchers had to be able to move in on very short notice, 
and to sometimes accept that the vessel had been directed elsewhere when we arrived at a base. 
When in port, crew and officers are very busy. Though interviews were squeezed in on such 
days, they largely could go undisturbed.  
 
We chose informants that all were directly or indirectly involved in the execution of the 
operation, and who represented a role that hoped would have information on one or more of the 
cases.  
 
All who were asked were willing to talk. Practical concerns during the mobilization phase 
dictated who we could reach and for how long. Those interviewed were captains, client reps, 
offshore managers, project engineers, medics, shift supervisors, ROV supervisors and one deck 
foreman. 
 
The recording of one offshore manager interview was damaged and the content lost. We also 
found that we could leave out the captains from the analysis reported in the present paper. Since 
the cases mostly concern the operational part of the organization, captains turned out to have 
limited knowledge of them. This left us with 35 relevant interviews. 
	
Procedure	for	Analysis	and	Validation	
A sample of interviews was discussed in a meeting in December 2011, and a draft for coding 
categories and an analysis template was constructed and later refined by one of the researchers 
(see Appendix 2). It was used so that each interview would be analyzed independently by a 
minimum of two researchers and subsequently discussed in validation meetings until consensus 
could be reached. 
 
The template presented here (see Figure 1) was revised one more time after the first validation 
meeting.  A research assistant was trained to help with the validations of the interviews. There 
were eight validation meetings in total.  
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The template served as a heuristic tool for two purposes. The first was to test if we have proof for 
the phenomenon of leadership redundancy. The second was to explore the reasoning that led 
informants to rate each intervention as productive, unproductive or conditional. The hope was 
that the second line of exploration would add to our understanding of the dynamics of the 
operations. 
 
The procedure consisted of these steps: 
 
Each researcher would apply the template for an interview individually. Each case within the 
interview was analyzed in the same way.  
 
Each template summarizes the analysis for one interview. The score for each case was indicated 
by putting the case number in the appropriate place in the table on the first page. For example, if 
an informant reported having observed the scenario in case #1, the case number would be 
recorded in the cell defined by column ‘check’ and row ‘I have seen it’. 
 
‘Confirmation’ answers were classified as an observation (‘I have seen it’); as participation (‘I 
have done it’, only applicable if the informant belonged to the same role as the interventionist in 
each case); or an assessment as plausible (‘it could have happened’).  
 
Similarly, if an informant rated the scenario as not observed, or as not having been active in this 
kind of intervention, the original plan was to rate these columns in a similar way. This category 
turned out to be redundant, since the absence of a positive rating under ‘confirmation’ contained 
the same information. The last category ‘it could not have happened’ was however used for those 
informants that explicitly evaluated a case scenario as unrealistic.  
 
The ‘evaluation’ columns scores for the informant’s evaluation of the intervention described in 
each case. The evaluations were scored as positive or negative or as uncertain. When the 
interview transcript showed an evaluation that was considered unambiguously positive or 
negative by two independent raters, they were scored as such. In cases of doubt, they were 
scored in the last category, illustrated by a ‘question mark’. This was also used when the 
informant made the evaluation conditional (dependent on additional conditions), or where the 
informant was undecided. 
 
For each score, the template invites the researcher to add notes. The notes consists of the 
researcher’s own notes and a selection of the relevant quotes, thus including the researcher’s 
thinking and the underlying data. Each data point or quote is identified with a code (informant 
code@text navigation point, e.g. ‘SS04@019’). 
 
We wanted to understand the informants’ reasoning, in particular on their evaluation of the case, 
hence question 2: ‘What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including 
contingencies’ that aims to discover why the informant might regard an intervention as 
appropriate, and who the appropriate interventionist(s) might be, under what conditions. 
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Figure 2: The Flow of the Data Analysis 
 
Each researcher used the template to score and describe his or her findings in each interview. 
 
Pairs of researchers came together in validation meetings, read each other’s analyses and 
discussed them. Discussions continued until consensus was reached in each case. 
Concerning the existence proof, we remained conservative in our scores of the cases. For 
example, we would only score as ‘have seen it’ an instance when the informant explicitly said 
that he or she had observed the intervention described in the case by people in the same role as 
the interventionist in the case. 
 
A Bento2 database was created to keep track of the results of the meetings. 
 
One of the researchers created the present summary document. It gives an overview of the 
findings relevant to the paper on informal leadership redundancy. This document was double-
checked by the research assistant for accuracy.3
																																																								
2	Bento	is	a	simple,	Mac	based	database	tool. 
3	Some	more	detailed	notes	on	the	technicalities	can	be	found	in	the	memo:	Notes	on	Using	the	Templates,	
March	1st,	2012. 
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Findings from the Stimulus Case Analyses 
In this section, we present findings based on the data collection based on stimulus case 
interviews carried out from June to December 2011. On seven visits to IMR vessels during port 
calls, two researchers conducted individual and group interviews. 
 
Our examples all relate to the key role of the shift supervisor. In our field study we had found 
that a shift supervisor tends to be occupied with task coordination while the operation is in 
progress. Yet unforeseen and unpredictable events that can disrupt the coordination of the 
operation do occur.   
 
When that happens the shift supervisor may be unaware of these events, given his confinement in 
the control room, even if they fall under his purview. A disruption can trigger a need for other 
leadership functions, but the shift supervisor may not have the necessary time or cognitive 
capacity to attend to them.  
 
In our field study (Johannessen et al., 2012) we had observed that other members of the multi-
team system with the capacity, skill, and authority (though not formal responsibility) sometimes 
stepped in to address the situation.  We referred to this excess leadership capacity in a multi-team 
system as informal leadership redundancy.   
 
In the current research we use stimulus cases to confirm or disconfirm the need for and existence 
of this resource, and to explore how members of the industry perceive it. The data reported in 
this section are mainly from the stimulus case interviews that were specifically designed to test 
the existence and explore the possible functioning of leadership redundancy. 
 
Some of the data are presented as quotes, broadly sorted by themes. These quotes are given 
consecutive numbers (e.g. Quote 4) and are connected to an informant (e.g. shift supervisor 07). 
In some cases, we report findings from the interviews by paraphrasing, and occasionally refer to 
specific points in our database (e.g. SS07@0030). 
 
Constraints	on	the	Shift	Supervisor’s	Role	
The new interviews confirm our observation in the field that, for the duration of the operation, 
the shift supervisor is, for the most part, physically confined to his control room, both for legal 
and practical reasons (Quote 1 and 2). Several informants say that this confinement limits the 
shift supervisors’ ability to know at all times what is going on, e.g. in the ROV control room or 
on deck. However, this depends on whether the activity is visible on CCTV, and on how close 
the shift supervisor’s control room is to the ROV control room. On some ships the two control 
rooms are near each other, while on others they are far apart.  
 
The interviews also confirm that the shift supervisor’s attention is mostly focused on task 
coordination during the execution of the operation (Quotes 3-5), so that he cannot easily attend to 
other leadership functions while the operation is in progress (Quote 6). Shift supervisor 04 is 
more optimistic than others about the chances of attending to coaching in the midst of an 
operation, but he also underscores that he cannot leave the control room (Quote 2).  
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On the other hand, many anecdotes suggest that the shift supervisors see themselves as more than 
task coordinators. For example, a shift supervisor who rates his chances of coaching an 
ineffective deck foreman in the midst of the operation as low, still sees cultivating a long-term 
cooperative relationship with the him as a crucial task, since the deck foreman is the shift 
supervisor’s “eyes and ears on deck” (Shift Supervisor 03). Coaching or learning conversations, 
however, cannot take place in the midst of the operation, according to this shift supervisor, but 
need to happen during mobilization, when he can move around freely. 
 
Table B: The Shift Supervisor’s Role 
Topic  Illustration 
Limited	degrees	of	
freedom	
Quote	1	
I	can	join	the	(people	in)	the	ROV	(control	room)	for	10	seconds,	this	means	that	
you	can	give	a	message	or	a	hint,	or	whatever	it	is,	but	then	you	need	to	go	back	
in	again	(to	the	shift	supervisor’s	own	control	room).	We	have	legal	obligations	
and	rules	that	we	can’t	leave	our	post	as	long	as	we	have	things	(equipment	
submerged)	in	the	sea.	
Shift	Supervisor	03	in	Case	#1	
Quote	2	
(...)	our	guidelines	are	such	that	the	shift	supervisor	can	only	be	replaced	by	the	
offshore	manager,	so	when	you’re	sitting	there	for	twelve	hours,	the	offshore	
manager	may	come	without	you’re	asking,	or	you	need	to	call	and	ask	him,	the	
only	off	time	you	get	is	going	to	the	loo	or	eating.	Well,	you	can	go	out	for	a	
smoke.	(...)	During	the	operation	you	are	stuck	here,	and	Statoil,	the	client,	
require	that.	
Shift	Supervisor	04	in	Case	#2	
Competing	
demands	on	the	
shift	supervisor’s	
time	and	attention	
Quote	3	
(...)	a	shift	supervisor	coordinates	the	ROV,	the	third	parties,	he	coordinates	deck.	
And	the	tower	(crane	operator)	of	course.	And	in	most,	in	many	cases	the	third	
parties	are	sitting	inside	directly	with	the	ROV	(pilots)	to	get	things	done,	so	that	
they	have	a	direct	tone	(verbal	communication),	and	need	less	communication	via	
intercom	on	board.	
Shift	Supervisor	05	in	Case	#1	
Quote	4	
The	shift	supervisor	is	often	busy,	this	varies	between	operations,	but	he	may	be	
busy	with	other	things,	what	is	going	on	right	now.	All	the	others,	engineers,	the	
OM,	the	client	are	those	who	run	around	thinking	about	the	next,	so,	I	would	say	
that	the	engineer	has	much	of	the	responsibility	of	what	happens	in	the	next	
phase	since	he	is	responsible	for	the	task	plan	and	what	we’re	going	to	do	in	the	
next	phase,	and	then	the	shift	supervisor	runs	the	show	(once	we	get	there).		
Project	Engineer	10	in	Case	#7	
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Table B: The Shift Supervisor’s Role 
Topic  Illustration 
Competing	
demands	on	the	
shift	supervisor’s	
time	and	attention	
Quote	5	
The	shift	supervisor	has	lots	of	other	things	to	consider.		He’s	got	the	vessel	and	
the	vessel	movements.		He’s	got	the	deck	and	the	deck	movements.		He’s	got	the	
crane	and	the	crane	movements.		He’s	got	one	or	two	ROVs.		That’s	five	or	six	
different	departments	he’s	trying	to	coordinate	all	at	one	go,	plus	reading	the	
task	plan,	plus	carrying	on	the	job.		So,	there’s	quite	a	lot	of	information	to	take	in	
and	also	to	pass	out.		If	you’re	the	best	(...)	in	the	world	and	you’re	working	twelve	
hours	a	day,	seven	days	a	week,	you	will	miss	something.		You’ll	never,	ever	get	it	
right	all	the	time.		All	you’ve	got	to	do	is	try	and	do	your	best.		There	will	be	
instances	where	you	do	miss	something.	
Shift	Supervisor	07	in	case	#7	
 
Quote	6	
(...)	he	does	have	the	overall	responsibility	to	keep	the	operation	running,	so	he	
can’t	sit	down	and	spend	a	lot	of	figuring	out	how	we’ll	get	this	bolt	loose	since	he	
has	several	parallel	systems	submerged	that	need	to	be	operated,	he	has	a	rig	or	
one	other	vessel	to	take	into	account	in	the	totality	of	the	operation.	So	it	is	not	
his	task.	He	is	meant	to	lead	the	operation,	that’s	his	task.	
ROV	Supervisor	04	in	Case	#7	
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Exercise	of	Leadership	Functions	
The stimulus cases below are based on situations taken from our field research (observations and 
interviews). Each case illustrates a situation that could jeopardize the success or safety of the 
operation, and the exercise of a leadership function - beyond the coordination focus of the shift 
supervisor - to remedy the situation. Case #1 involves protecting the boundary around a team of 
pilots who are responding to an accident, so that they can work undisturbed.  Case #3 involves 
providing coaching to a deck foreman who is not managing his team effectively. Case #7 
involves discovering and solving a technical problem that could negatively affect the next phase 
of an operation.  In each case, someone other than the person we understood to be formally 
responsible takes the initiative to intervene.  We asked our research subjects to give their views 
on how realistic the situation was, whose responsibility it would normally be to manage this 
situation, why intervention would be necessary, and their evaluation of the intervention described 
in the case scenario.   
 
Boundary management 1 (Case #1) 
Maintaining the boundary around a team can be important to protect it from interference.  In this 
case, a minor accident has happened and one part of an operation has to be put on hold while an 
ROV is brought to the surface for repairs. The incident is not critical, but also not trivial; the 
possibility of pollution is taken seriously; an interruption costs money; and the (unlikely) loss of 
the robot would cost a million dollars and cause further delays. A client rep who is in the ROV 
control room starts a discussion about what led to the accident while the pilots are still hard at 
work containing the immediate damage. An offshore manager sees this as an inappropriate 
disturbance, and guides the client rep away to an adjacent room to continue the discussion.  
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Table C: Confirmation of the Intervention in Case #1 
Role  Observations  Plausibility   
	 Has	seen	 Has	done	 Has	not	
seen	or	
done	
Could	have	
happened	
Could	not	
have	
happened	
Missing	
data	
Sum	
Client	Rep	 0	 0	 0	 5	 1	 0	 6	
Offshore	
Manager	
0	 0	 0	 4	 0	 0	 4	
Project	
Engineer	
1	 0	 1	 3	 0	 0	 5	
Medic	 1	 0	 2	 3	 0	 0	 6	
Shift	
Supervisor	
3	 0	 0	 5	 0	 0	 8	
ROV	
Supervisor	
5	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 5	
Deck	
Foreman	
0	 0	 0	 1 0 0 1
Sum	 10	 0	 3	 21	 1	 0	 35	
 
 
Informants confirm that the context and the triggering situation are realistic. Technical 
breakdowns that need to be contained do occur, and there is consensus that discussing why the 
accident happened before it is contained is problematic and needs to be interrupted so the team 
can focus on the recovery of the ROV (Quote 7). All but one informant see the behavior of the 
client rep in the scenario as inappropriate.  
 
Table C shows a classification of responses about the intervention in the case scenario (not the 
triggering situation).  Informants that explicitly reported an observation of a similar real life 
event are classified as such. Others, who have not reported an observation but have explicitly 
said they thought the intervention could or could not have happened are classified under 
‘plausibility’.  
 
Most of the informants, regardless of their role, say that they have either seen this type of 
disturbance handled like this, or that they think it could happen.   
 
In their evaluations of the action taken by the offshore manager most informants see it as positive 
(including all the client reps interviewed). There is more variance in opinion amongst the 
informants as to whether disturbance of this kind can be expected from a client rep, and, if so, 
how frequent it may be. The client reps tend to see it as unlikely or infrequent. Among those who 
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think it is likely, only one offshore manager says that this happens ‘frequently’. Some informants 
describe the behavior in the scenario as that of an inexperienced client rep. 
 
Everyone, including the client reps, say that the shift supervisor is primarily responsible for 
maintaining this boundary (Shift Supervisor 08 said that he would do so 90% of the time), but 
that, in principle, anyone, including the ROV supervisors or the pilots themselves, could 
intervene with the client rep. No one said there was a problem with somebody else stepping in 
for the shift supervisor in this situation, but there is variance as to how much courage informants 
think it would take (see Quotes 9 and 10). The role of the informant does not affect their 
perception and evaluation of this situation. 
 
As we saw in the discussion of the shift supervisor’s role, his ability to intervene is limited by the 
competing demands on his time and attention (in this case, keeping the rest of the operation 
going while two of the pilots are salvaging the damaged ROV); by his physical location; and by 
his legal obligation to remain in his own control room (see quotes 1, 3 and 8).  
 
Responses to this case confirm that disturbances requiring boundary management are realistic in 
the world of IMR operations. At times, the capacity and ability of other individuals to step in for 
the shift supervisor enable the system to cope effectively. 
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Table D: Boundary Management 
Topic  Illustration 
Why	the	
boundary	must	
be	managed	
Quote	7	
I	would	take	them	out	of	the	way.		The	priority,	in	my	mind,	is	to	contain	the	incident,	
stop	what’s	happening,	argue	about	it	by	all	means	but	somewhere	else	at	a	later	
date.		[I’m?]	going	to	stop	casting	blame	or	whatever	or	trying	to	stop	that,	by	all	
means	do,	but	at	a	later	date	or	further	away.		At	the	moment,	it’s	containing	the	
incident	and	stopping	the	problem	from	getting	worse.		
Shift	Supervisor	07	
Quote	8	
Technically,	the	shift	supervisor	should	probably	have	drawn	the	line	as	well	and	
moved	him	away	from	the	situation.		However,	the	Senior	ROV	Supervisor	is	probably	
more	concerned	about	what’s	going	on	in	front	of	him.		The	shift	supervisor	is	
probably	in	that	situation	as	well,	wondering	what’s	going	on;	whereas	the	Offshore	
Manager	is	probably	more	able	to	get	an	overall	impression,	just	take	a	step	back,	
and	let	his	guys	deal	with	it—as	long	as	he	knows	what’s	going	on	and	[2	words]	to	
take	that	guy	aside.	
Medic	06	
Others	than	the	
shift	supervisor	
might	intervene	
Quote	9	
It	could	be	the	ROV	supervisor,	and	ROV	pilots	with	some	gravitas	(‘pondus’),	typical	
trainees	would	not	do	this.			
Project	Engineer	10	
Quote	10	
Yes,	such	things	happen.	That	there	are	many	people	around	that	can	be	a	
disturbance	(...).	If	the	Offshore	Manager	is	around,	he	would	automatically	take	the	
initiative.	If	he	is	not,	then	I	would,	if	I	were	there,	politely	give	them	feedback	and	
say	that	they	are	not	wanted	here	now	since	they	are	an	extra	stress	factor	for	those	
conducting	the	operation.	So,	if	I’m	not	there	then	it’s	guaranteed	that	the	assistant	
(ROV	supervisor)	or	the	pilots	would	(draw	the	line),	they	are	so	confident.	
ROV	Supervisor	07	
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Coaching (Case #3) 
The deck on an IMR vessel can be a confusing place, often noisy, full of equipment, cranes, 
ROVs and people engaged in a variety of simultaneous tasks. Work on deck is the most 
immediately dangerous part of IMR operations. Shift supervisors consider the action on deck as 
critical for safety and the flow of the operation, but have limited ability to control it directly. 
They therefore rely in large measure on competent deck foremen (Quotes 26, 27).  
 
In Case #3, a medic notices over a couple of days that a new deck foreman seems to be 
neglecting his leadership duties with his inexperienced riggers. It looks like he is performing the 
work on deck himself, while the riggers stand by idly. The medic gets concerned and takes the 
initiative to speak privately with the deck foreman, who indicates that he is open to feedback.  
 
Table E: Confirmation of the Intervention in Case #3 
Role  Observations  Plausibility   
	 Has	seen	 Has	done	 Has	not	
seen	or	
done	
Could	have	
happened	
Could	not	
have	
happened	
Missing	
data	
Sum	
Client	Rep	 0	 0	 3	 2	 0	 1	 6	
Offshore	
Manager	
0	 0	 1	 3	 0	 0	 4	
Project	
Engineer	
0	 0	 2	 3	 0	 0	 5	
Medic	 1	 0	 1	 4	 0	 0	 6	
Shift	
Supervisor	
2	 0	 4	 2	 0	 0	 8	
ROV	
Supervisor	
0	 0	 3	 2	 0	 0	 5	
Deck	
Foreman	
0	 0	 1	 0 0 0 1
Sum	 3	 0	 15	 16 0 1 35
 
 
Case# 3 is the most controversial on several dimensions.  Five of the eight shift supervisors 
directly confirm that this type of situation (inexperienced riggers, and a deck foreman who fails 
to delegate and put them to work) does occur, and is a plausible concern (Shift Supervisors 04, 
05, 06 07 and 10). One shift supervisor confessed to making this mistake himself when he was a 
deck foreman earlier in his career. He attributed it to a time/efficiency tradeoff; it may be faster 
and safer for a deck foreman to do the work himself than to get new riggers up to speed (Shift 
Supervisor 06).  However, five informants questioned the realism of the situation. In their 
experience, it would be unlikely to have both an inexperienced deck foreman and inexperienced 
riggers on deck simultaneously.   
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Realism aside, of the 30 informants from whom we have data, 13 see the intervention as positive 
and 17 have a mixed (11) or negative (6) evaluation.   
 
Those who favor the intervention cite several reasons: the situation is potentially dangerous 
given the many hazards on deck (Quote 31); feedback from the medic may be experienced by the 
deck foreman as less threatening than feedback from his direct supervisor (Medics 08, 03 and 04, 
Project Engineer 10, Shift Supervisor 05); timely intervention by the medic could prevent the 
situation from escalating (Client Rep 09); and the intervention enables the medic to test his 
assumptions about the situation (Medics 03, 05 08). Several who favored the intervention 
cautioned that the medic should first check the facts (given that Medics are not typically 
experienced in deck operations). Others said that the medic might actually need to intervene 
more immediately and forcefully if he perceived an imminent threat to the safety of the deck 
crew (Project Engineer 09, Client Rep 04). 
 
From the medics’ perspective, five of the six we interviewed said that medics should be 
proactive in situations that have the potential to threaten the safety of the crew, and that giving 
feedback to a deck foreman in this situation is appropriate. They emphasized, however, that, 
given the formal command structure on an IMR vessel, their intervention could include involving 
the deck foreman’s supervisor.  One medic joked that the likelihood of a deck foreman accepting 
the feedback was about 50/50 (Medic 05).  
 
Those who did not favor the medic’s intervention said that it is beyond the medic’s mandate, 
training and experience to give feedback to a deck foreman on how he leads his crew (Offshore 
Manager 03, Medic 06 and Quotes 30, 31 and 32)4.  Formally, the deck foreman reports to the 
offshore manager, and, during the execution of the operation, all team leaders are under the 
command of the shift supervisor. Therefore, from this perspective, either the shift supervisor or 
the offshore manager is the appropriate person to coach the deck foreman. However, there is not 
a consistent view about which of the two has primary responsibility, which suggests a lack of 
role clarity in the system.  
 
Five of the client reps, both offshore managers, one shift supervisor, and one ROV supervisor see 
the offshore manager as having primary responsibility for coaching the deck foreman. Seven of 
the shift supervisors say that the shift supervisor is the right person to coach the deck foreman, 
with the option of taking it to the offshore manager if coaching is not successful. The deck 
foreman we interviewed thought that the shift supervisor should be the primary person to 
intervene, while the offshore manager had secondary responsibility. As he commented, “(...) 
That feels like the right sequence. The medic shouldn’t be involved in it, really” (Deck 
Foreman03@0008).  
 
Aside from the issue of who is responsible, there is also the issue of who is aware that the deck 
foreman is having difficulty.  Four shift supervisors thought that they (or an offshore manager) 
would or should have noticed, and handled the problem on deck themselves, if it became evident 
																																																								
4	While	‘coaching	the	deck	foreman	on	coaching’	is	the	intervention	suggested	in	the	scenario,	some	
informants	pointed	out	other	possibilities,	such	as	moving	people	between	shifts,	e.g.	get	a	more	experienced	
deck	foreman	on	night	duty	to	take	over. 
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during mobilization. The scenario, however, is based on a situation where the problem became 
evident during the execution of the operation, during which the shift supervisor is confined, for 
the most part, to his control room. Two shift supervisors doubted that, in this situation, they 
would have picked up the problem on their own (shift supervisors 06 and 08), and that it would 
be difficult for the shift supervisor to deal with it himself in the midst of an operation (Quote 26 
and 27).  
 
Table F: Case #3 Coaching 1 
Topic  Illustration 
The	situation	on	
deck	is	important,	
but	hard	to	control	
for	the	shift	
supervisor	
Quote	265	
I	would	‐	in	my	experience,	when	you	come	to	a	new	place,	one	of	the	first	that	I	
get	in	touch	with	and	try	to	get	to	know	is	the	deck	foreman.	For	he	is	my	eyes	
and	ear	on	what	goes	on	on	deck.	And	that	relationship	needs	to	be	based	on	
mutual	respect.	If	I	notice	that	this	is	an	inexperienced,	recently	promoted	person	
that	tells	me	to	spend	more	time	on	deck,	to	get	the	job	done,	you	might	say.	
People	are	different	(…)	some	may	be	good	as	deck	foreman,	but	bad	at	handling	
people.	I	need	to	form	an	opinion	about	that	very	quickly	to	make	it	work.		
	
Shift	Supervisor	03@0023	
Quote	27	
(…)	I	have	no	way	of	picking	up	this	situation,	I	can	of	course	see	them	on	deck	
when	I’m	working	with	the	camera,	but	I’m	paying	attention	to	other	things	also,	
so	it’s	not	certain	that	I	see	the	situation	for	what	it	is,	so	since	these	riggers	are	
new,	I’m	not	sure	that	they	would	have	come	to	me	and	said	anything	about	it	
either.	
		
Shift	Supervisor	06@0008	
The	medic’s	
potential	lies	in	his	
skills	and	his	open	
mandate	
Quote	28	
The	advantage	is	that	he	comes	in	from	the	side	as	a	fellow	traveller	you	might	
say,	a	peer,	this	is	not	the	offshore	manager	correcting,	a	superior	(...)	the	medic	
has	so	little	to	do	on	these	vessels	that	he	is	the	only	one	who	has	the	time	for	
these	things,	he	can	be	a	researcher	of	sorts.	
	
So	he	can	observe	things,	he	can	write	cards	about	it,	observation	cards	that	
concern	individuals,	it	is	a	good	thing	to	raise	that	under	four	eyes	and	say	what	
he	has	observed	and	check	if	he	has	seen	correctly.	I	think	that	it	is	great	to	ask	
questions	like	that.	(...)	If	you	give	feedback	to	the	person	next	to	you	they	may	
hear	it	as	criticism	(...).	
	
Even	if	it	is	constructive	and	well	intended	some	may	take	offense,	but	that’s	the	
way	it	is.	So	that’s	a	barrier	to	doing	it,	but	maybe	that	medic	was	thinking	it’s	
part	of	my	job,	he	sees	it	as	his	mission	to	walk	around	and	observe.	
	
Project	Engineer10@0007‐0008	
																																																								
5	The	jump	in	quote	numbers	happens	since	the	presentation	of	findings	on	Case	#2	have	
been	removed	in	the	second	edition	of	the	present	report.	
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Table F: Case #3 Coaching 1 
Topic  Illustration 
Quote	29	
Speaking	from	the	point	of	view	of	this	type	of	vessel	and	what	we	do,	the	Medic	is	
supposed	to	be	impartial.	He	tends	to	get	on	with	most	of	the	people,	and	he’s	
supposed	to	be	without	fear	or	favors	when	they	speak	to	the	medic	himself.	So	
that	is	an	independent	person	who	can	go	and	speak	to	different	people,	which	is	
fine	in	my	view.	So	the	medic	can	go	and	speak	to	one	of	the	riggers	or	me,	or	
whoever	it	may	be.	Maybe	there	is	a	problem.	I	don’t	know.	But	the	medic	is	free	
to	(....)	go	speak	to	anybody	and	ask	them	any	questions	like	that.	Personally,	as	a	
chain‐of‐command	thing,	I	don’t	think	that’s	a	problem	for	the	Medic.	
	
Shift	Supervisor	07@0011	
 
 
On the one hand, the development needs of the deck foreman may be the responsibility of his 
formally designated leader, whether it be the offshore manager in general, or the shift supervisor 
during the course of the operation. Yet, many informants say that the inability of the deck 
foreman to manage his crew effectively is a potential safety hazard, and as such, needs 
immediate attention. If the formally designated leaders are unaware of the problem, or are unable 
to handle it, then the medic’s capacity, willingness, and skill to do so is a potential additional 
leadership resource that enables a multi-team system such as this to cope with surprise.  The 
leadership deference is not necessarily to expertise, but to capacity. 
 
Informants often express the ideal of collective responsibility for safety; that no one can stand 
idly by and let a safety concern slide, regardless of their roles. Resourceful medics take active 
part in shaping their roles, which are somewhat ambiguous in the flux of day-to-day operations.  
They represent a resource that may occasionally fill leadership functions, but that may be 
controversial.
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Table G: Case #3 Coaching 2 
Topic  Illustration 
Ambiguities	in	the	
medic’s	role	
Quote	30	
It	is	a	good	thing	that	the	medic	observes,	that’s	his	job	and	he	is	an	HSE	advisor,	
so	that	is	only	positive.	But	I	don’t	think	that	it	is	right	that	he	goes	straight	to	
the	deck	foreman	to	talk	with	him	about	how	he	does	his	job.	It	would	have	been	
more	appropriate	to	come	and	talk	with	us	who	are	responsible	for	deck.	Either	
talk	to	me	or	to	the	offshore	manager	if	he	has	a	concern.	
Shift	Supervisor10@0011	
Quote	31	
Well,	the	starting	point	is	that	[the	medic]	is	out	observing,	but	that	he	goes	and	
talks	with	[the	deck	foreman]	under	four	eyes	is	unusual.	He	might	well,	he	has	
the	time,	if	it	jeopardized	safety	he	might	have	flagged	it	earlier	and	spoken	with	
the	offshore	manager,	since	the	deck	foreman	and	the	riggers	report	to	him.	
Because	it	is	[problematic]	to	be	a	leader	and	also	carry	out	the	work,	you	can	
easily	go	wrong	with	safety	and	loose	the	overview	over	the	whole	operation.	
Then,	nobody	is	paying	attention.	So	if	[the	medic]	is	standing	behind	and	looking	
at	the	whole	scene	[the	medic]	might	have	waited	until	the	end	of	the	shift,	and	
then	spoken	with	the	offshore	manager	and	the	deck	foreman.	If	it	was	a	very	
critical	operation	he	should	have	interrupted	the	right	there	and	then.	
	
ROV	Supervisor	07@100	
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Table G: Case #3 Coaching 2 
Topic  Illustration 
Ambiguities	in	the	
medic’s	role	
Quote	32	
Yes,	I	have	seen	some	borderline	cases,	you	might	say.	Where	some	find	it	easier	
to	do	the	work	themselves,	rather	than	training	new	people.	That	happens.	
	
Researcher:	
And	that	a	Medic	takes	on	a	sort	of	coaching	role,	have	you	seen	that	also,	or	not?	
	
Offshore	Manager	06:	
Sure.	I	see	that,	too.	It	happens	on	this	vessel	also,	but	in	many	cases	he	will	
consult	with	me	at	the	same	time.	We	have	[open	channels]	,	you	know.	That	I	
would	be	informed,	if	anything...	
	
Researcher:	
Let’s	say	you	wanted	to	teach	a	new	medic	to	do	his	job	right,	how	would	you	
explain	to	him	that	in	this	case,	he	should	have	come	to	you	first	(...)	what	would	
be	the	rule	he	should	have	in	his	head?	
	
Offshore	Manager	06:	
That’s	a	little	intricate	and	a	good	question.	Well,	if	he	sensed	that	this	would	
jeopardize	safety,	meaning	that	people	were	not	in	full	control	over	the	deck,	
then	I	would	have	wished	(...)	if	you	observe	such	things	(...)	I	need	to	know	that,	
we	can’t	have	that.	(...)	I	need	to	be	informed	if	such	things	happen,	and	for	the	
medic	to	step	in	as	a	kind	of	leader	trainer...that	can’t	be	right.	
	
Researcher:	
No,	so	that	would	be	crossing	a	line?	
	
Offshore	Manager	06:	
Yes,	I	think	so.	
	
Offshore	Manager	06@340	
 
 
 
Problem solving (Case #7) 
In case #7, a client rep notices a technical problem with a guide post6 that had not been 
anticipated in the plans and that would affect the next phase of the operation. This client rep 
takes the initiative to solve the problem with the offshore manager and others, and engages in 
developing a solution that is eventually turned into a new task plan. The scenario does not 
specify any involvement of the shift supervisor, but the client rep is quoted as saying, “Strictly 
speaking, it is the shift supervisor’s responsibility to anticipate challenges and make sure that the 
work moves smoothly from one operation to the next. But we all need to be able to step in when 
necessary.” 
																																																								
6	A	guide	post	is	a	slide	fastened	on	the	subsea	installation	that	guides	tools	and	components	from	the	vessel	
into	the	right	place. 
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Table H: Confirmation of the Intervention in Case #7 
Role  Observations  Plausibility   
 Has	seen	 Has	done	 Has	not	seen	or	
done	
Could	have	
happened	
Could	not	
have	
happened	
Missing	
data	
Sum	
Client	Rep	 1	 0	 0	 2	 1	 2	 6	
Offshore	
Manager	
0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 2	 4	
Project	
Engineer	
0	 0	 2	 1	 1	 1	 5	
Medic	 1	 0	 1	 0	 0	 4	 6	
Shift	
Supervisor	
1	 0	 3	 1	 0	 3	 8	
ROV	
Supervisor	
1	 0	 1	 3	 0	 0	 5	
Deck	
Foreman	
0	 0	 0	 0 0 1 1
Sum	 4	 0	 7	 8	 3	 13	 35	
 
 
We have 22 reactions to Case #7. The triggering situation - that the realities at a destination can 
be different from those anticipated in the plans - was not contested by any of the informants (e.g. 
Quote 33).  
 
Twelve say that they have either seen a client rep intervene in this way, or that it could have 
happened. Seven have not seen it, and three think it could not have happened at all.  Those who 
thought that it was unlikely cited two reasons:  1) the level of active involvement of the client rep 
seemed to be going too far, and 2) the shift supervisor seemed to be excluded from the problem 
solving process, and a formal Management of Change (following the procedure to change 
procedures) seemed to be missing.   
 
In the scenario, a client rep notices a problem and contributes to solving it. Taking initiative to 
solve problems is a widely held value in these operations (Quotes 34, 35 and 42), and is 
considered an obligation if the problem is a safety issue.  However, one shift supervisor thought 
that this kind of action on the part of a client rep would be infrequent since, as he said, “a client 
would know that it was outside his remit” (Shift Supervisor 08@0019). One shift supervisor 
suggested that this client rep, by becoming “too hands on”, might make the oil company liable 
for possible mistakes (Quote 40). 
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There is, however, wide recognition that a problem of this kind might be hard for a shift 
supervisor to notice or handle (Quotes 4, 5, 35 and 36) for several reasons: 1) he does not have 
time to deal with technical issues at this level of detail (Quote 6 and 37), 2) the attention to 
coordination may give him tunnel vision (Quote 36), and 3) he may not have the right 
background for this particular challenge (Quote 39 and 40).  
 
This case, like Case #3, got mixed evaluations. Eight give a positive evaluation of the client rep’s 
intervention and 14 are negative (10) or mixed (4).  
 
Those who are critical read the scenario as bypassing a proper Management of Change that 
requires deeper involvement of the crew and the shift supervisor. A couple said that there is 
always the option to stop the operation and have a meeting of all the relevant players, 
particularly the shift supervisor (Quotes 40 and 41).  
 
Some who react positively read the case as an unusual way of working that still respects proper 
procedures. They underscore that it makes sense to be pragmatic since the shift supervisor may 
be too involved in the execution of the ongoing operation. The creative work can flow 
informally, as long as the offshore manager and the project engineer are involved (Quote 42). 
Seen through this lens, one project engineer comments that it is great that the client rep “is 
actively participating and thinks like an engineer” (Project Engineer 10@011). 
 
The informants do not provide a simple or consistent answer to who in this case, is responsible 
for problem identification and problem solving. Most informants view this as a collective 
responsibility, except for one shift supervisor who says that that the operation would need to be 
put on hold and the shift supervisor be put in charge of a full (Shift Supervisor 10@0018).  
 
Clients and subsea contractors alike insist that bad plans from the shore organizations could be to 
blame, since they had not correctly identified the problem with the guidepost. Many informants 
see calling attention to problems and coping with them on the vessel as a collective responsibility 
(e.g. Quotes 33, 37 and 43). 
 
Our data confirm that the coping strategy utilized in the case scenario occurs. As long as a client 
rep takes care not to overstep his authority (e.g. take work directly to the project engineer) and 
acts in full understanding with the offshore manager, he may perform parts of the problem 
solving that in other cases the shift supervisor would perform. In the real situation that Case #7 is 
based upon, the client rep and the offshore manager thought that they could contribute to the 
flexible flow of the next step of the operation by performing this leadership function. 
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Table H: Case #7 Problem solving 
Topic  Illustration 
Surprises	happen	
and	the	shift	
supervisor	may	need	
help	
Quote	33	
Researcher:	
Have	you	seen	anything	like	this?		Is	the	sequence	of	events	realistic	to	your	
mind?	
	
Shift	Supervisor	07:	
Um,	yes,	to	some	degree.		Things	do	get	done	behind	the	scenes	during	
operations,	because	when	operations	are	going	on	they	tend	to	be	a	continuous	
thing.		And	if	something	crops	up	further	on	down	the	line,	it’s	up	to	the	people	
who	see	it	or	to	the	people	who	can	sort	that	problem	out.		Maybe	they	should	
have	asked.		From	(the	case),	it	seems	that	nobody	has	actually	spoken	to	the	
shift	supervisor	and	said,	It’s	not	just	his	responsibility.		It’s	also	the	engineer’s	
responsibility	to	make	sure	the	equipment	is	fit	and	functional	for	the	purpose.			
	 	
If	there’s	going	to	be	a	problem,	if	the	shift	supervisor	[hasn't?]	seen	it,	how	come	
the	engineer	hasn't	seen	it	either	and	how	come	the	people	who	planned	the	
operation	haven't	seen	it?		We’re	now	relying	on	one	person	to	catch	the	
problem	before	it	goes	any	further.		So,	it’s	unfair,	I	would	say	just	reading	this,	
to	blame	the	shift	supervisor	for	not	resolving	the	problem,	which	is	somebody	
else’s	problem	in	effect.		[3	words]		Ultimately,	it’s	got	to	stop	with	him.		After	it’s	
been	caught	by	the	client	and	the	offshore	manager,	they’re	working	on	a	
solution.		But,	the	problem	should	never	have	occurred	in	the	first	place	or	
should	have	been	foreseen.	
Shift	Supervisor	07@0014	
Quote	34	
Yes,	this	is	familiar	to	me.	I	would	say	that	it	is	out	of	the	question	that	I,	as	the	
client	on	board,	would	sit	down	and	wait	for	the	problem	to	emerge	when	I	had	
noticed	it.	So	that	action	was	taken	since	he	noticed	it	I	think	is	fine.	And	he	
contacted	the	offshore	manager	to	discuss	it,	that’s	the	natural	thing	to	do,	these	
are	proper	communication	channels.	That	the	offshore	manager	did	not	include	
the	project	engineer	in	that	discussion	of	1	hour	and	20	minutes	is	a	little	
unfortunate.	I	would	say	that	the	(...)	engineer	should	have	been	part	of	the	
dialogue	from	the	beginning.	If	they	had	brought	together	the	people	that	were	
needed	I	think	that	people	would	have	bought	in	to	the	solution	earlier	(...)	and	
you	reduce	the	risk	that	it	feels	imposed	from	above,	which	I	see	as	a	danger	
here.		
Client	Rep	06@015	
Quote	35	
Sometimes	the	shift	supervisor	has	already	moved	from	the	deck.		There’s	a	
guide	post	problem.		They're	not	always	on	the	deck	to	see	everything;	whereas	
you’ve	got	deck	foremen,	riggers,	engineers,	and	so	on,	who	hopefully	catch	it	
before	that,	which	does	happen	on	lots	of	occasions.		There’ll	be	something	that’s	
going	to	happen	and,	hopefully,	the	deck	foreman	has	a	good	enough	working	
relationship	with	the	shift	supervisor	to	go	and	say,	“Look,	we’re	going	to	have	a	
problem	with	this.”			
Shift	Supervisor	07@0016	
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Table H: Case #7 Problem solving 
Topic  Illustration 
Surprises	happen	
and	the	shift	
supervisor	may	need	
help	
Quote	36	
It	is	a	fact	that	if	you	are	very	focused	on	a	task	your	vision	can	get	quite	narrow,	
and	you	may	not	notice	the	obstacle	outside	your	visual	range.	But	those	sitting	
a	bit	on	the	sideline	of	the	operation	may	notice	it.	
Client	Rep	04@0016	
Quote	37	
Of	course	it	is	part	of	the	shift	supervisor's	job	to	think	ahead,	but	could	he	in	this	
case	have	predicted	it?	Had	he	received	enough	good	information	from	the	client	
(Statoil)	in	advance?	
	
If	yes,	then	maybe.	It	depends	what	the	problem	with	the	guide	post	is	(…)	The	
shift	supervisor	has	his	hands	full	with	the	operation.	He	can't	sit	down	to	solve	
such	a	problem.	
	
Client	Rep	09@110‐120	
Quote	38	
Not	all	shift	supervisors	have	the	technical	background	for	solving	all	the	
technical	tasks	‐	they	have	varied	backgrounds,	some	shift	supervisor	come	from	
the	ROV	side,	others	come	from	totally	different	administrative	tasks	and	have	
been	given	this	position.	
	
ROV	Supervisor	04@0010.		
Quote	39	
Maybe	your	shift	supervisor	has	come	from	being	a	survey	guy,	which	happens.		
They’ve	got	no	deck	experience,	so	they	don't	know	how	it’s	supposed	to	be.		
Maybe	the	shift	supervisor	has	come	from	the	deck	and	doesn't	know	how	the	
survey	works,	or	the	deck	and	is	not	100	percent	sure	how	the	ROV	works.		You	
can't	have	a	shift	supervisor	who’s	been	in	charge	of	survey,	in	charge	of	ROV,	in	
charge	of	deck,	and	in	charge	of	the	ship.		You	can't	have	somebody	who’s	been	
in	charge	of	all	the	departments	because	that	would	be	the	perfect	person	and	
we	don't	have	that.		We	have	people	who	tend	to	be	quite	good	at	what	they	do	
in	their	department	who	then	get	promoted	up,	and	then	you	have	to	learn	what	
other	things	happen.			
	 	
If	this	guy	had	come	from	the	deck	department,	maybe	he	would	have	seen	it.		If	
he	didn't,	whether	or	not,	he	might	have	been	an	ROV	supervisor	who	had	been	
very	good	at	managing	people	and	being	an	ROV	supervisor	who	then	got	
promoted	to	shift	supervisor.	
	
Shift	Supervisor	07@0016	
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Table H: Case #7 Problem solving 
Topic  Illustration 
Concerns	about	the	
strategy	in	the	
scenario	
Quote	40	
(...)	if	anything	had	gone	wrong	from	(the	client	rep’s)	making,	it	would	have	
highlighted	the	situation	even	worse	because	he	was	doing	something	that	he	
shouldn’t	have	done,	really.	
	
Shift	Supervisor	08@0018	
Quote	41	
We	are	taught	that	everything	is	to	take	as	long	as	it	needs.	So	(the	shift	
supervisor)	should	have	been	involved	in	any	case,	I	think.	
	
ROV	Supervisor	05@0009	
The	client	rep	may	
be	a	resource	
Quote	42	
The	client	probably	did	the	right	thing	(...)	
	
There	are	some	clients	who’ll	come	up	and	start	screaming	and	shouting	about	
it—they’re	doing	nothing	about	it	but	screaming	and	shouting.		That’s	the	worst,	
whereas	this	particular	one	has	made	the	effort,	spoken	to	the	people,	and	had	
the	problem	resolved	with	foresight	and	got	it	sorted.			
	
Say	you’re	working	on	a	jigsaw	puzzle.		When	you’re	that	close	to	the	jigsaw	
puzzle,	you	can't	see	all	the	pieces.		You	can't	see	the	ones	over	there.		If	you’ve	
just	come	into	the	room,	you	can	say,	“Hey,	you’re	missing	a	piece.		It’s	over	
there.”		It’s	as	simple	as	that.”		
	
Shift	Supervisor	07@0017	
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Appendix 1: Stimulus Cases and Interview Guide 
A small pool of cases was developed based on the preliminary findings from the 2009 field trip. 
These were discussed with insiders in the business for consistency and accuracy of contextual 
detail. We performed a test run for this kind of data collection in June 2011. We found that one 
of the cases (#4) was less suited for testing the existence of leadership redundancy, and we 
replaced it with #7. The other cases were modified to reduce sources of misunderstandings. The 
new versions below (#1, 2, 3 and 7) were used in the rest of the data collection (the informants 
had the option of reading scenarios in English or Norwegian). The interviews based on case #2 
were later excluded from our analytical work, since colleagues argued that it was ambiguous as 
an example of informal leadership redundancy (see Foreword to the second, revised edition of 
the present report). 
 
Case	#1	
During an operation to recover an FCM from a template7, there is a sudden leak of hydraulic oil 
from a manipulator on one of the ROVs. Oil spills directly into the sea under a pressure of 120 
bar while being emptied. 
 
The client rep, the third party experts and the senior ROV supervisor are present in the ROV 
control room. The offshore manager has just arrived. The shift supervisor is in the adjacent 
control room, busy containing the damage while keeping the operation in motion. 
 
The client rep starts a discussion about why and how the incident could happen. He uses a 
critical tone and tries to engage the pilots in a discussion. The offshore manager interrupts the 
conversation, and quickly guides the group away to a different room to continue there, leaving 
the pilots behind to go on with their work. Two pilots continue working with the intact ROV 
while the other pilot team recovers the leaking ROV to the surface for repairs. 
 
Interview guide: 
 
• Have you seen leading personnel intervene (such as the OM did here) on your 
vessel? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of handling the situation like the OM 
did? 
• Can you imagine a different way of handling it that you would recommend more? 
• Have you heard of such a thing occurring on your vessel or on a different vessel? 
• If no: Do you believe it might happen? 
• Can you describe a different example that this reminds you of? 
 
Case	#2	
The license rep is talking to a shift supervisor to influence him to take on more responsibility for 
specific part of the pumping operation in a scale squeeze8. This lies outside his normal duties. 
																																																								
7	A	tool	from	the	sea	bed.	
8	An	operation	to	clean	the	access	to	a	well.	
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But this shift supervisor is on the verge of giving in to the request, meaning to accommodate the 
client.  
 
The offshore manager arrives at the scene. He makes clear that the shift supervisor is under no 
contractual obligation to do as told, and, moreover, that he does not have the necessary skills. 
The appropriate way to perform the operation is to use the whole team, including the vessel 
pumping crew and the third party supervisor. The license rep accepts the offshore manager’s 
intervention. 
 
Interview Guide: 
 
• Have you seen leading personnel intervene (such as the OM did here) on your vessel? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of handling the situation like the OM did? 
• Can you imagine a different way of handling it that you would recommend more? 
• Have you heard of such a thing occurring on your vessel or on a different vessel? 
• If no: Do you believe it might happen? 
• Can you describe a different example that this reminds you of? 
	
Case	#3	
The medic has time to walk around and have informal contact with people, and is more likely 
that many others to pick up early signals of problems and needs. He notices the new deck 
foreman talking with his two riggers9. The riggers are new; the medic has not seen them before. 
The deck foreman walks over to a small crane and begins to operate it, while several other 
operations are in progress on deck. It strikes the medic as odd that the riggers are left standing 
idly behind. 
 
Over several days, he notices a pattern, and gets concerned. The deck foreman does not seem to 
fill some of his leadership role; of keeping an overview, having an eye on safety, delegating 
duties, and coaching the new riggers when needed. The medic decides to see if the deck foreman 
may be open to some feedback and advice himself, and asks to talk with him in private when he 
is off-duty. The deck foreman turns out to appreciate this opportunity to talk to someone about 
his work. 
 
Interview Guide: 
 
• Have you witnessed a medic intervene like this on your vessel? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of handling the situation like the medic 
did? 
• Can you imagine a different way of handling it that you would recommend more? 
• Have you heard of such an intervention occurring on your vessel or on a different 
vessel? 
• If no: Do you believe it might happen? 
• Can you describe a different example that this reminds you of? 
 
																																																								
9	Deck	hands.	
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Case	#4	
While the operation is ongoing, the offshore manager is not as tied up in so many specific 
operational duties as the shift supervisor. He needs to be available if contractual issues arise, but 
he can move around physically and to some degree choose how he spends his time. 
 
One offshore manager describes how he can support the on-going operation, especially if it is a 
difficult one. He contributes to an informal atmosphere by dropping jokes and making supportive 
comments. He believes that this puts the pilots at ease and helps boost their confidence. This, in 
turn, may have a positive effect for safe operations, he believes.  
	
Interview Guide: 
 
• Have you seen leading personnel intervene (such as the OM did here) on your vessel? 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of handling the situation like the OM did? 
• Can you imagine a different way of handling it that you would recommend more? 
• Have you heard of such a thing occurring on your vessel or on a different vessel? 
• If no: Do you believe it might happen? 
• Can you describe a different example that this reminds you of? 
  
Case	#7	
A client rep gives an example of when they became aware of an unresolved problem in an 
upcoming operation.  It concerned one of the template’s guideposts10. He commented: “Strictly 
speaking, it is the shift supervisor’s responsibility to anticipate challenges and make sure that the 
work moves smoothly from one operation into the next. But we all need to be able to step in 
when necessary”.  
 
The client rep and the offshore manager sat and talked about how they could solve it.  They 
made some sketches, puzzled over it, walked around the departments, and after 1 hour and 20 
minutes they had a solution.  After the initial discussion client rep then went to the project 
engineer and proposed the solution.  The engineer considered the technical aspects and 
performed detailed calculations to make sure it was feasible.  Then the client rep and the 
engineer went to the tower crane operator and modified the solution, and finally took it to the 
offshore manager for approval.  When that was granted, the engineer worked out a task plan for 
the operation.  From the time they started working on the idea until the guidepost lay on the deck 
took 8 hours.   
 
Interview Guide: 
• Have you seen anything like this – is the sequence of events realistic? 
• What are your reactions to the way the client rep is thinking in this case? (Pros and 
cons) 
• In the example, the client rep describes how other individuals compensate for what is 
“strictly speaking” the shift supervisor’s responsibility. What is your reaction to this? 
• If the story is realistic, what, in your mind, might prevent the shift supervisor for 
taking care of the matter himself? 
																																																								
10	A	broken	tool.	
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• Can you imagine a different way of handling it that you would recommend more? 
• Have you heard of such an intervention occurring on your vessel or on a different 
vessel 
• If no: Do you believe it might happen? 
• Can you describe a different example that this reminds you of? 
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Appendix 2: Analysis Template11 
	
Analysis	STI	(stimulus	case)	Interview	
STI Interview: File name  
Informant:  Informant category and number 
Researcher:  Name of researcher who did the interview 
Analyst:  Name of researcher who did the analysis 
Date:    
  
Existence	 Description	 Check	 Evaluation	
+ ‐	 ?	
	
Confirmation	
I	have	seen	it	 	 	 	 	
I	have	done	it	 	 	 	 	
It	could	have	happened	 	 	 	 	
	
Disconfirmation	
I	have	not	seen	it	 	 	 	 	
I	have	not	done	it 	 	
It	could	not	have	happened	  	 	
 
 
Comments 
 
Stimulus	Case	#1	
1. Confirmation/disconfirmation, and evaluation 
2. What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including contingencies? 
Why: an intervention is necessary 
Who: is the appropriate interventionist 
3. What does the informant say specifically about the appropriate lines of command in this 
case and who is the appropriate “owner” of the leadership challenge illustrated? 
4. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the role? 
5. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the MTS, including balancing flexibility and 
structure? 
6. New themes and additional quotes 
 
Stimulus	Case	#2	
1. Confirmation/disconfirmation, and evaluation 
																																																								
11	After	the	first	test	run,	the	team	had	decided	that	the	original	Case	#	4	would	not	be	used.	Cases	1,2,3	and	7	
were	renumbered	and	used. 
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2. What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including contingencies?  
Why: an intervention is necessary  
Who: is the appropriate interventionist 
 
3. What does the informant say specifically about the appropriate lines of command in this 
case and who is the appropriate “owner” of the leadership challenge illustrated? 
4. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the role? 
5. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the MTS, including balancing flexibility and 
structure? 
6. New themes and additional quotes 
	
Stimulus	Case	#3	
1. Confirmation/disconfirmation, and evaluation 
2. What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including contingencies? 
3. What does the informant say specifically about the appropriate lines of command in this 
case and who is the appropriate “owner” of the leadership challenge illustrated? 
4. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the role? 
5. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the MTS, including balancing flexibility and 
structure? 
6. New themes and additional quotes 
 
Stimulus	Case	#4	
1. Confirmation/disconfirmation, and evaluation 
2. What is the logic behind the informant’s evaluation of the case, including contingencies? 
What does the informant say specifically about the appropriate lines of command in this 
case and who is the appropriate “owner” of the leadership challenge illustrated?  
3. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the role? 
4. What are the challenges and dilemmas for the MTS, including balancing flexibility and 
structure? 
5. New themes and additional quotes 
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Complex and tightly coupled operations, despite 
having clear command lines and rigorous procedures, may 
be vulnerable to unexpected events that threaten their 
operations. To succeed, they need the capacity to respond 
flexibly and swiftly. In subsea operations, it has been pro-
posed that when disruptive events occur while the formal 
leader is focused on task coordination, others with suffi-
cient time, competence and standing step in and exercise 
informal leadership. This leadership redundancy has been 
described as a managerial resource that provides critical 
organizational slack. The present paper describes a meth-
odology to test the leadership redundancy hypothesis, and 
summarizes preliminary findings.
